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ABSTRACT
This paper develops several points concerning the design and implementa-
tion of a carbon tax. First, if implemented without any offsetting changes
in transfer programs, the carbon tax would be regressive. This regressivity
could be offset with changes in either the direct tax system or transfers.
Second, the production and consumption distortions associated with small
carbon taxes, on the order of $5/ton of carbon, are relatively small: less
than $1 billion per year for the United States. Stabilizing carbon dioxide
emissions at their 1988 levels by the year 2000, however, would require a
carbon tax ten to twenty times this size. It would more than triple the
producer price of coal and nearly double the producer prices of petroleum and
natural gas, would have much more significant private efficiency effects.
Third, a central issue of carbon tax design is harmonization with other fiscal
instruments designed to reduce greenhouse warming. Ensuring comparability
between taxes rates on chlorofluorocarbons and fossil fuels is particularly
important to avoid unnecessary distortions in production or consumption
decisions.
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Mounting scientific evidence suggests that carbon dioxide emitted in
fossil fuel combustion contributes to global warming. This has prompted
discussion of carbon taxes, taxes levied in proportion to the carbon dioxide
emissions which result from burning different fuels, in virtually all develop-
ed nations. Because each individual nation's contribution to global CO2
emissions is relatively small, most advocates of the carbon tax call for
coordinated multinational action. The long-run prospects for coordinated
action appear dim, however. A tax large enough to significantly slow carbon
dioxide emissions would collect revenues equal to several percent of world
GDP, and it seems unlikely that national governments would cede control over
such a pool of resources to any international body.
Most countries cannot noticably slow the rate of global greenhouse gas
emissions. Nevertheless, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands have taken
unilateral action in adopting carbon taxes. Other nations may follow their
lead in adopting national carbon taxes, with revenues accruing to the domestic
treasury. Most previous discussions of the carbon tax, however, have been
concerned only with plans for multilateral action. This paper addresses a
number of tax design issues which are likely to emerge if the current trend
toward unilateral carbon tax adoption continues.
The paper is divided into five sections. The first describes the basic
structure of the carbon tax, focusing on the policies already in place in
Europe as well as proposed taxes for the United States. Section two considers
the distributional burden of carbon taxes across income groups. Household
data for the United States suggest that the carbon tax falls most heavily on
low-income groups. This regressivity could be ameliorated, however, in
various ways. The third section examines the production and consumption
2distortions from a carbon tax, using a simple partial-equilibrium model of the
energy market. These estimates do not correspond to the net efficiency cost
of carbon taxes because they neglect the reduction in externalities associated
with these taxes, but they indicate the cost which must be balanced against
potential efficiency gains from the externality channel. Section four
discusses the short- and long-run macroeconomic effects of adopting a carbon
tax, using previous empirical studies of the relationship between tax rates
and real output growth. A central issue in this regard is the disposition of
carbon tax revenues. If the tax proceeds are used to reduce other taxes, the
adverse output effects of the tax would be significantly smaller than if they
are used to finance higher government outlays for climate research or other
programs. The macroeconomic effects of a carbon tax are also likely to depend
on the way monetary authorities respond to the new levy. Section five
considers several design issues relating to carbon taxes, such as harmoniza-
tion with other greenhouse taxes and the difficulty of taxing fossil fuel use
in imported intermediate goods. There is a brief concluding section which
discusses broader issues of policy design.
31. The Carbon Tax: Existing Legislation and Proposals
The carbon tax is a tax on carbon emissions generated by the combustion
of fossil fuels. Of the three major fossil fuels, coal produces the most
carbon per unit of energy, followed by oil and then natural gas. The carbon
tax is a specific tax, i.e., a fixed absolute amount per ton of coal or barrel
of oil. The tax is designed to internalize the externalities associated with
fuel consumption, so it should not vary with shocks to fuel prices as an ad
valorem tax would.
To provide a perspective on the potential of a carbon tax to affect
greenhouse warming, Table i reports current gas emissions by nation. The
entries are presented in terms of "equivalent tons of CO2 " using conversion
factors developed by the World Resources Institute. 1 The table illustrates
the importance of carbon dioxide in contributing to the global greenhouse.
CO2 from fossil fuel combustion currently accounts for 42% of net greenhouse
emissions, and for 56% of the non-CFC emissions. This fraction is significant
for long-range policy, since current regulations in developed nations promise
to sharply reduce emissions of CFCs during the coming decades. Because carbon
dioxide emissions are also expected to grow rapidly in the coming half
century, CO2 is even more important than the table suggests.
Table 1 also illustrates, however, that no single nation or group of
nations is sufficiently important to significantly affect the rate of global
carbon emissions. The United States, the largest carbon emitter, accounts for
1Nordhaus (1990a) uses a different metric for converting different
greenhouse gases into equivalent units than the estimates by the World
Resources Institute (WRI) in Table 1. The Nordhaus approach suggests that
total CO2 emissions account for 69% of current greenhouse emissions, compared
with 63% in the WRI tabulations.
4just over twenty percent of world CO2 emissions from fossil fuel consumption.
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All of Europe accounts for an emission level comparable to that from the
United States. Projected growth in energy utilization during the next century
suggests that China will become an increasingly important source of carbon
emissions as it uses its large coal deposits to spur industrialization.
Current Carbon Taxes
Despite the limited effect of any single nation's carbon tax on global
warming, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands have already adopted such taxes.
Flavin (1990) discusses a number of other proposals for action in Europe as
well as particular states of the U.S. Part of the argument for unilateral
action is presumably to provide a role-model for other nations. Table 2 shows
the tax rates on coal, petroleum derivatives, and natural gas in each nation.
The Swedish tax is levied at a rate of approximately $62/ton of carbon,
compared with approximately $6.50/ton in Finland and $1.50/ton in the Nether-
lands. The taxes in both Sweden and Finland are set at rates which reflect
the marginal carbon emissions from each fuel. There are some divergences from
this principle in the Dutch scheme, which places a higher relative tax on
petroleum derivatives than the carbon criterion alone would suggest.
Carbon taxes are not the only excises on fossil fuels in any of the
nations which have adopted them. In Finland, for example, the tax rate on
gasoline and diesel fuel is higher than that required for "carbon-parity" with
the coal tax as a result of the traffic-fuels tax. In Sweden, a pre-existing
tax on all energy was cut in half when the carbon tax was enacted, but the
2The other important source of carbon dioxide is deforestation, which is
not significant in developed nations.
5total tax rates on different energy sources still reflect the sum of the
general energy tax and the carbon levy. The net taxes on different fuels are
thus not dictated by their carbon contents alone; the analysis below suggests
that they should not be.
Although the United States does not have a carbon tax, several proposals
for such a tax are before Congress. For example, H.R. 4805, a bill introduced
by Representative Pete Stark, calls for a tax of $15.00/ton on coal, $3.25/
barrel on oil, and $.40/MCF on natural gas. These tax rates are well below
those which a recent study by the Congressional Budget Office (1990) suggested
would stabilize carbon dioxide emissions at their 1988 level by the year 2000.
Table 3 provides descriptive information on the policy analyzed by the
Congressional Budget Office, a $100/ton carbon tax, as well as a more modest
tax of $5/ton which would be roughly equivalent to the tax per unit of
greenhouse gas activity embodies in U.S. taxes on chlorofluorocarbons. The
table reports the specific tax rates which each carbon tax would levy on coal,
oil, and natural gas, and also shows the percentage change in fossil fuel
prices as a share of the well-head or mine-mouth price. The CO2
stabilization tax would raise coal prices to roughly four times their current
level. Natural gas prices would nearly double, and oil prices would increase
over 60%. The price changes are proportionately smaller under the more modest
carbon tax plan.
The carbon tax applies only to fossil fuels. In this way it differs from
an across-the-board energy tax, for example a BTU tax, since it both en-
courages energy conservation while also encouraging substitution toward energy
sources such as hydro-power or nuclear power which do not emit carbon dioxide.
It also differs from targetted excises such as a gasoline tax in taxing all
6combustion of fossil fuels, rather than those in particular industries or
applications. Levying higher taxes on only some segments of fossil fuel use
requires higher tax rates on the taxed sectors to achieve a given reduction in
emissions, and also introduces distortions across uses. There is little
reason to introduce these distortions if the ultimate aim of policy is
reducing the level of greenhouse emissions at least cost.
The Revenue Potential of Carbon Taxes
Carbon taxes have the potential to generate substantial revenues for most
developed countries. Table 4 illustrates this, showing total consumption of
each of the three fossil fuels as well as carbon tax revenues from a $100/ton
carbon tax. The ratio of revenues to GNP is highest in the U.S., the most
fossil-fuel-intensive nation. A $100/ton carbon tax would raise revenues of
more than three percent of GNP. By comparison, the same tax would raise only
1.2% of GNP if instituted in Japan. This reflects the greater energy ef-
ficiency of the Japanese economy.
A central issue in carbon tax design involves who receives the revenue.
As Schelling (1990) aptly observes, no industrialized nation is likely to
surrender control over revenues equal one thirtieth (or even one hundredth) of
GNP to an international organization. Proposals for a global carbon tax are
therefore face a dilemma. If the tax rate is high enough to significantly
reduce emissions, few if any countries will allow an international agency to
collect the taxes. If the tax rate is low enough to make an international
agency operational, however, it is unlikely to discourage significant amounts
of fossil fuel combustion. The next several sections therefore concentrate on
unilateral domestic carbon taxes.
72. Distributional Incidence of Carbon Taxes
One of the central objections to adopting carbon taxes in developed
nations is the perceived regressivity of excise taxes, of which carbon taxes
are an example. Claims of excise tax regressivity typically rely on annual
surveys of consumer income and expenditures which show that energy expendi-
tures are a larger fraction of income for very low income households than for
middle or high-income households. A household's annual income may be an
unreliable indicator of its actual well-being, however. The essence of the
life-cycle and and permanent-income theories of consumption is that household
income may vary from year to year, for both predictable and stochastic
reasons, but that consumption is set on the basis of long-run income. These
theories imply that a household's total expenditures may be a more reliable
indicator of economic well-being than the same household's annual income. 3
This section uses data from the United States' Consumer Expenditure
Survey to assess the claim that carbon taxes are regressive, measuring
household well-being on the basis of both annual income and consumption
outlays. The results support the view that a carbon tax is regressive, but
the findings based on the expenditure measure of incidence are less dramatic
than those based on income rankings. They nevertheless suggest that if a
carbon tax were adopted without any offsetting changes in other tax or
transfer programs, the burden would fall more heavily on low-income than well-
off households.
Energy Expenditure Patterns
3This point is developed in more detail by Davies, St.-Hilaire, and
Whalley (1984), Kasten and Sammartino (1988), and Poterba (1989).
8The 1985 Consumer Expenditure Survey is a stratified national sample of
approximately two thousand households.4  To illustrate patterns of energy
expenditures across the distribution of household well-being, households are
grouped into deciles based either on their income in the previous quarter, or
their total expenditures in the current quarter. Table 5 shows the average
expenditure patterns for households in each of these categories, focusing on
outlays for heating oil, gasoline, electricity, and natural gas. There are
some omitted energy outlays, such as direct household outlays for coal and
wood, but these are a small fraction of the outlays shown in the table.
Since energy is a necessity, it is not surprising that the share of income
which low-income households devote to heating fuel, electricity, and gasoline
is significantly higher than that of better-off households. The upper panel
in Table 5 classifies households by income, and reports energy expenditures as
a share of income. For the lowest income decile, which spends substantially
more than its income, both gasoline and electricity outlays exceed ten percent
of income. Because many households in the bottom income strata may be
experiencing transitory income reductions, however, a more reliable picture of
the distribution of energy outlays emerges from focusing on the second and
third income deciles versus the top deciles. These data suggest a clear
pattern of larger outlays as a share of income at lower rather than higher
income levels. Total energy outlays for households at the 25th percentile of
the income distribution are approximately 16% of income, compared with only 7%
for households at the 75th percentile of the distribution.
4 Poterba (1990) describes the data sample in more detail, and uses a
similar approach to study the distributional burden of higher gasoline taxes
in the United States.
9The lower panel in Table 5 presents comparable data with households
grouped into deciles according to total expenditures. The results are
significantly different from those based on the income ranking, and indicate
the potential importance of choosing among the alternative approaches to
measuring distributional incidence. The disparity between the shares of
income devoted to various energy sources at low and high incomes is much
larger than the variation in expenditure shares between low- and high-expendi-
ture households. For example, a household in the second expenditure decile
devotes approximately twelve percent of total outlays to energy items,
compared with just under ten percent for a household in the ninth expenditure
decile. The ratio of income shares devoted to energy for households in the
second and ninth income deciles, by comparison, is more than two-to-one.
The expenditure ranking is likely to provide a better perspective on the
distributional burden of energy outlays and associated taxes for two reasons.
First, some households experience transitory shocks to income -- unemployment
or illness, for example -- and their expenditures will reflect long-run
economic circumstances rather than transitory conditions. Second, lifecycle
variation in the outlay-income ratio, for example periods of low income
relative to expenditure during retirement, can make current income a mislead-
ing guide to economic well-being. The data in Table 5 thus suggest that
energy outlays are higher among less well-off households, but not by as much
as typical incidence measures might suggest.
Carbon Tax Burdens
The data in Table 5 on energy expenditure patterns are a critical input in
analyzing the distributional burden of the carbon tax. The analysis which
follows considers a specific proposal: a $100/ton carbon tax instituted in
1990. 5 This avoids the problem of forecasting energy producer prices in
future years, and also corresponds better to the available data on expenditure
patterns. The analysis also assumes that the United States imposes a unilat-
eral carbon tax, so that producer prices of each fossil fuel are unaffected;
there is complete forward-shifting of the carbon tax.
These assumptions translate into substantial increases in the retail
prices of fossil fuels. Based on projected retail energy prices in 2000, as
reported in the Annual Energy Outlook, the retail prices of fuel oil and
gasoline would rise by 27% and 25% respectively, the retail price of natural
gas by 23%, and the retail price of coal by 114%. The other important
component of the incidence calculation is the change in electricity prices.
Although coal accounts for 57% of the electrical generating capacity in the
United States, compared with 5.5% for oil and 9.4% for natural gas, coal costs
are only 17.1% of the total for U.S. electrical generation.6 Petroleum
accounts for 4.4% of total costs, and natural gas for another 8.7%. These
fractions have shifted significantly during the last fifteen years as U.S.
5Given concerns about the macroeconomic effects of instituting a carbon
tax, it is unlikely that such a plan would be instituted without a significant
phase-in period. The distributional results presented here, however, are
likely to provide some evidence on the long-run effects of such plans.
6These estimates of fuel shares of total kilowatt-hours generated are
drawn from the Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 1988.
The data on the various fuels' shares of costs are based on data in the Edison
Electric Institute 1984 Statistical Yearbook.
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electric utilities have converted from oil to coal to reduce the nation's oil
imports. Following the Annual Energy Outlook (1990) assumptions regarding the
difference between the retail prices of fossil fuels and those faced by
utilities, the retail price of electricity is estimated to rise by 36% as a
result of a $100/ton carbon tax.
Estimated changes in retail prices can be combined with the data on
energy expenditure patterns in Table 5 to estimate the distributional burden
of the carbon tax. Results of this exercise are shown in Table 6, which
reports both the absolute dollar cost and the extra outlays as a share of
income and total expenditures for various income and outlay deciles. The
tabulations suggest that carbon taxes are regressive, regardless of whether
income or expenditures are used as the basis for ranking households. For
households in the bottom three income deciles, for example, a $100/ton carbon
tax would pose an average burden of more than five percent of annual income.
For households in the top two income deciles, the estimated burden is less
than two percent. The disparities in the estimated burdens are smaller when
expenditure rather than income is used to rank households, but these differen-
ces are still substantial. Households in the bottom three expenditure deciles
would face burdens which averaged 3.7% of their total expenditures, while the
burdens for those in the top three deciles would average 2.6% of total
outlays. The relative burden declines smoothly as one moves up the expendi-
ture distribution.7 Although these calculations relate to the $100/ton carbon
tax, the general distributional pattern would apply to any carbon tax. A
7Johnson, McKay, and Smith (1990) present similar calculations for the
United Kingdom, showing somewhat greater regressivity of energy taxes even
using the expenditure incidence basis.
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$5/ton tax, for example, would impose costs of roughly 1/20th those reported
in Table 6.
These findings do not completely describe the distributional incidence of
carbon taxes, for many reasons. First, they ignore the general equilibrium
effects of higher fossil fuel prices. The prices of steel, aluminum, autos,
and other energy-intensive commodities would rise in response to a carbon tax.
While the magnitude of these price changes will be smaller than the first-
order effects analyzed here, they should be addressed in future work. Second,
the analysis ignores asset market effects. Even if the world price of fossil
fuels stays fixed, the returns to intermediaries, such as oil refiners and
distributors, would fall. If this reduced the value of equities in oil
companies, it would appear as an additional burden falling primarily on those
in the higher income and expenditure categories. Finally, the analysis
neglects the macroeconomic effects which might follow from enactment of a
carbon tax. If households at different points in the income or expenditure
distribution face different exposures to unemployment, then slower growth
would burden households differentially.
Policies to Offset Regressivity
The carbon tax would be regressive if it were instituted as a stand-alone
policy. However, this is not an especially plausible scenario. The recent
history of tax policy in most industrial nations suggests strong political
resistance to imposing higher taxes which particuarly burden the poor. A
central issue is therefore likely to involve designing schemes to neutralize
the distributional effects of the carbon tax.
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Several policies would reduce the burdens on low-income and low-expendi-
ture households. First, many transfer programs are already indexed for price
changes. Since the carbon tax will be paid by consumers in the form of higher
retail prices, indexed components of income will partly adjust to offset the
tax burdens. In the United States, for example, two thirds of the income
received by households in the lowest expenditure decile is indexed, reflecting
the importance of elderly families who receive Social Security as well as
other transfer recipients in this group. 8
Indexed income is not a complete antidote to carbon tax regressivity. Not
all low income households are transfer recipients, and even for those who are,
the data in Table 5 show that their expenditure patterns place more weight
than average on energy outlays. Thus transfer adjustments based on average
budgets will under-compensate low-income or low-expenditure households for
their higher energy prices.
A second approach to ameliorating the distributional burdens of the
carbon tax is increased use of redistributive income taxes. In the United
States, for example, the EITC (Earned Income Tax Credit) provides a natural
device for reducing the tax burdens on those low-income households who receive
labor income rather than transfers. Changing the level of personal allowances
in the tax code would provide another way to redistribute toward low-income
and low-expenditure households, although with different incentive effects.
Still a third approach to reducing regressivity would be an explicit
policy of tax credits for energy expenditures. Allowing each household a tax
8Such indexed transfers are also important for households in the second
expenditure decile, where they constitute 46% of income, but decline at higher
expenditure levels.
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credit equal to the first one or two percent of income devoted to purchasing
energy would enable the tax authorities to alter the average price of energy,
hence blunting the carbon tax' redistributive effects, while preserving the
marginal price effects of the tax.
None of the redistributive schemes described above will completely offset
the distributional impact of a carbon tax. If transfers are increased,
households who do not receive transfers will still be worse off. If tax
credits are used, households with incomes below the tax-filing threshold will
not be compensated. Yet the distributional effects of the carbon tax do not
appear insuperable. A combination of income tax and transfer policies could
be used to neutralize the tax reform for most households.
3. Production and Consumption Distortions from a Carbon Tax
A carbon tax would affect the behavior of firms and consumers. By
raising the price of fossil fuels relative to other energy sources, and by
changing the relative prices of different fossil fuels, the tax would induce
both inter-fuel substitution and lower energy consumption. Although these
changes may on balance be beneficial because of their long-run effects on
global climate, they nevertheless represent production and consumption
distortions relative to the no-tax scenario. The costs associated with these
distortions must be balanced against the benefits from lower risk of global
warming. This section presents simple estimates of these costs.
Partial Equilibrium Tax Analysis
The standard approximation for the deadweight loss from a commodity tax
when there are no external effects associated with consumption of the good is
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DWL - dQ*dq/2, where Q is the quantity and q is the consumer price of the
good. The derivatives represent the effects of a small tax imposed with no
pre-existing taxes, anad the analysis takes prices in all other markets as
given and fixes producer prices in the market being analyzed. When only one
price is affected by a specific tax, a convenient expression for this
efficiency cost is
(1) DWL - nD*(r/p)
2
*(pQ)/2.
In this expression, nD is the compensated elasticity of product demand, r is
the specific tax rate, and p is the (fixed) producer price.
When several prices change, however, as they do in the case of a carbon
tax which alters the prices of coal, oil, and natural gas, the analysis must
recognize both own- and cross-price effects. This is particularly important
in the current context, where changes in the prices of all three fossil fuels
will lead to smaller changes in the demand for each fuel than would changes in
each market in isolation. In this case, the cost of production and consump-
tion distortions is given by
(2) DWL' i - [Zeij(rj/pj)]*QiPi*(ri/Pi)/ 2 .
The bracketed expression represents the proportional change in the quantity of
good i demanded as a result of tax changes in each of the j markets.
9
These results involve a first-order approximation which applies to small
taxes introduced around the no-tax equilibrium. Coordinated international
action with respect to carbon taxes would inevitably alter producer prices for
fossil fuels. For unilateral policies, however, it is more natural to treat
9The analysis assumes no pre-existing taxes in any markets, which is not
quite accurate for the fossil fuel markets in many developed nations. The
problem of pre-existing taxes will be addressed in the next draft.
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the world fossil fuel price as fixed. The partial equilibrium framework may
be suitable for this problem, even though for larger taxes it is necessary to
use computable general-equilibrium models. 1 0
Demand elasticities are the central parameters needed to estimate the
deadweight burden of carbon taxes. There is a voluminous previous literature
devoted on the estimation of energy demand; Bohi (1981) surveys this field.
Energy demand elasticities are very sensitive to the horizon being analyzed;
short run elasticities are far smaller than long-run values. With respect to
gasoline, for example, Pindyck (1979) reports a first-year demand elasticity
of -.11, rising to -.49 at a five year horizon and -.82 at ten years. The
dramatic differences are due to the variety of margins on which consumers can
optimize. In the first year after a price shock, most of the response takes
the form of reduced driving, while over longer runs, there is a change in fuel
efficiency of the auto fleet which exerts much more important effects on
gasoline demand. Similarly, in industry, the short-run response to energy
price changes will involve changes in the scale of operations; in the longer
run, capital equipment may be modified or replaced to optimally adapt to the
new price regime.
Table 7 presents benchmark own-price demand elasticities for coal, oil,
and natural gas for use in deadweight loss calculations. These reflect
concensus estimates as reported by Anderson, Hofmann, and Rusin (1990). They
are within the range of long-run elasticities reported by Bohi (1981),
although they are lower than some of the final-demand energy elasticities he
1 0A general equilibrium analysis of a world carbon tax, recognizing the
effects on producing countries and also the changes in world fossil fuel
prices, is presented in Whalley and Wigle (1990).
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reports. For evaluating the carbon tax, however, the elasticities of interest
are those for coal, crude oil, or natural gas demand with respect to the mine-
mouth or well-head price. The comparison of these values with retail gasoline
price elasticities, for example, is therefore inappropriate. Nevertheless, it
is important to understand that low elasticity estimates imply small dead-
weight losses; the efficiency cost is proportional to the elasticity. Thus,
it is straightforward to evaluate the sensitivity of the results to, for
example, a doubling of each own-price elasticity.11 The table also shows
significant cross-price elasticities for the various fossil fuels.
Estimating Production and Consumption Distortions
The local approximation approach described above is unsuitable for
analyzing the effects of large tax changes such as the $100/ton CO2 stabiliza-
tion tax for the United States discussed above. This tax would raise coal
prices by 263%, and oil and gas prices by between 70 and.100%. This approach
can, however, be used to analyze smaller tax changes, such as the $5/ton
carbon tax which has been suggested by Nordhaus (1990b). 1 2
The results of this calculation, which are presented in Table 7, suggest
that distortionary costs are not a critical consideration in evaluating low-
1 1The sensitivity of the estimated deadweight losses to changes in the
demand elasticites may be more complex than this suggests. If the policy
being analyzed is simply a given specific tax on carbon content, then lower
elasticities will translate into lower deadweight burdens. If the policy is a
requirement for a given percentage reduction in carbon emissions, however,
lower elasticities will in turn require higher tax rates; this effect will
raise the deadweight burden.
1 2The preliminary results in Table 7 assume away any pre-existing taxes
on fossil fuel use. For petroleum, the presence of gasoline taxes in most
developed nations makes this assumption suspect. Recognizing these pre-
existing taxes would raise the estimated deadweight burdens on oil.
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rate carbon taxes. The total production and consumption distortion in the
three markets is less than $300 billion, measured in 1989 dollars, or less
than one one-hundredth of one percent of GNP. At least for policies like the
"precautionary" carbon tax, the efficiency loss from the tax would be small. 1 3
This analysis awaits further confirmation using general equilibrium modelling
tools.
4. Macroeconomic Effects of Carbon Taxes
The efficiency costs isolated above correspond to the distortions in firm
and household behavior in an economy with otherwise perfect markets. In such
a setting, these would be the only effects of enacting a carbon tax. Prices
of many goods would adjust to the tax, but this would not generate any
macroeconomic effects. In practice, both nominal wages and nominal prices are
costly to adjust, and excise tax shocks can have real effects. A number of
recent studies 14 indicate that adopting the sort of carbon tax considered
above would reduce U.S. real GNP by between one and three percent.
There are two channels through which a carbon tax could have such effects.
First, a $100/ton carbon tax adopted without any offsetting policies would
substantially reduce the federal deficit. Estimates for the United States
suggest that such a tax would collect revenues of more than 3% of GNP. This
would represent a radical shift toward contractionary fiscal policy. While
1 3These estimated deadweight burdens compare favorably with those from
other revenue sources; see for example Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley
(1985).
14 Studies which simulate the long-run effects of a carbon tax on economic
activity include Manne and Richels (1989), Hogan and Jorgenson (1989), and the
Congressional Budget Office (1990).
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deficit reduction might convey long-run benefits, in the short run there might
be adverse macroeconomic effects. These might result from the higher overall
tax rates, direct and indirect, associated with such a policy; this could
discourage labor supply, for example.
A carbon tax need not raise revenue, however. It could be combined with
other fiscal reforms to ensure revenue neutrality. In European countries
which rely on indirect taxes for significant revenue shares, a natural policy
would involve reducing the VAT or other excise tax rates when the carbon tax
is introduced. For the United States, it would be possible to reduce income
taxes to offset carbon tax revenues. The critical simulation is thus a
revenue neutral increase in carbon taxes, and this is not usually reported in
the prior literature.
The second channel through which a carbon tax could affect real output
involves the sluggish adjustment of wages and prices in response to higher
taxes. The importance of these effects depends critically on how monetary
policy responds to the tax policy shock. To illustrate this effect, consider
enactment of a carbon tax with an offsetting reduction in labor income
taxes.15 The household's after-tax real wage is given by w(l-p)/p(l+8), where
, is the labor income tax rate and 6 is the total indirect tax rate. The real
wage facing firms is w/p, where w is the nominal wage paid by the firm and p
is the producer price level. The revenue neutrality of the tax policy should
keep (1-~)/(l+e) approximately constant, so the producer real wage which was
an equilibrium before the tax shock will also be an equilibrium after it.
1 5This analysis draws heavily on the more general discussion in Poterba,
Rotemberg, and Summers (1986).
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In the money market, the real supply of money M/[p(1+6)] equals the
demand which in turn depends on real output. If output were unaffected by the
tax change and the money supply were also fixed, then an increase in 8 would
require a reduction in producer prices (p). If prices were fully flexible,
higher indirect taxes would lead to an immediate and equiproportionate fall in
producer prices and wages, and there would be no effects on real activity. If
nominal wages are slow to adjust, however, then the fall in producer prices
following the tax change will raise the real wage facing firms. This will
reduce labor demand and lower real output.
This scenario need not occur, however. If the monetary authority
increases the supply of money to accomodate the tax increase, then the initial
level of w and p will continue to be an equilibrium; the only difference is
that the price level will be higher after the indirect tax increase than
before. The extent to which a revenue-neutral shift to indirect taxes such as
the carbon tax raises prices, and the extent to which it reduces output,
therefore depends on the monetary response to the fiscal change.
The importance of price rigidities, and hence the magnitude of the
foregone output associated with adoption of a carbon tax, is controversial.
The empirical evidence presented in Poterba, Rotemberg, and Summers (1986)
suggested that a three percent of GNP shift from direct to indirect taxation
would reduce real GNP by .6 percent in the quarter when the tax change took
effect. The lost output in the first three years after the tax policy takes
effect is nearly three percent of one year's GNP.
One important feature of this analysis, which relies on price rigidities,
is that in the long run a revenue-neutral shift to higher energy taxes would
not affect real activity. This view is inconsistent with the finding of some
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recent studies which suggest that higher energy prices would adversely affect
long-run productivity growth rates and therefore have progressively larger
adverse effects on economic performance. If the growth slowdown coincident
with, and following, the 1973 oil price shock is attributed to higher energy
prices, taxes which raised energy prices would be predicted to have similar
effects in the future. Whether the productivity slowdown of the 1970s was
caused by the oil price shock, or actually began well before the price
increase, is an open issue with obvious implications for policy analysts
concerned with global warming.
5. Implementing Carbon Taxes
This section addresses four issues which arise in implementing carbon
taxes: the choice of carbon taxes in the presence of other externalities, the
control of cross-border energy flows, the subsidization of processes which
withdraw carbon from the atmosphere, and the harmonization of the carbon tax
and other taxes which affect greenhouse emissions. Each of these issues is
considered in turn.
The Greenhouse and Other Externalities
While excise tax rates on fossil fules which are proportional to their CO2
output may be appropriate to correct greenhouse externalities, they are not
necessarily the optimal tax rates on the different fossil fuels. Standard
results on optimal taxation in the presence of externalities, for example
Sandmo (1975), recognize that optimal tax rates in the presence of exter-
nalities depend on three factors: (i) the net externalities associated with a
good's consumption; (ii) the distribution of a good's consumption across
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households with different marginal social welfare weights; and (if there is a
positive revenue requirement) (iii) the compensated elasticities of demand for
the taxed good, and other goods, with respect to the price of the taxed
commodity.
A detailed calculation of "the" optimal tax rates on various fossil fuels
is beyond this paper, but it is possible to sketch how other considerations
might affect optimal taxes. First, with respect to other externalities, coal
is a more substantial contributor to other types of air pollution (sulfur
dioxides and particulates, for example) than either oil or natural gas.
Estimates of the externality costs of these emissions vary. In the case of
sulfur emissions, however, Bernow and Marron (1990) suggest a value of
$1500/ton of SOx. For the United States, average SOx emissions per ton of
coal burned by electric utilities are approximately 42.2 poundsl6, suggesting
an externality cost of $32. Similar calculations could be performed for other
pollutants and other fuel sources to find the total externality-correcting
taxes which are needed.
Second, distributional considerations do not yield particularly strong
guidance in setting the relative tax rates on the different fossil fuels.
Table 5 suggested that electricity outlays are skewed more toward low-income
households than are expenditures for other types of fossil fuels. Since coal
is important for electricity generation but not for direct energy purchases,
this would suggest ceteris paribus that tax rates on coal should be lower.
One issue which might warrant attention concerns the burden of reduced coal
output. Coal miners bear the brunt of such changes, and previous policy
16This is based on data in Joint Committee on Taxation (1987).
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debates have explicitly considered compensation plans to avoid these effects
(see Congressional Budget Office (1987)).
Carbon Taxes and Border Controls
One of the major administrative concerns with a unilateral carbon tax
concerns imports. The appropriate taxes on domestic fossil fuel production are
relatively straightforward to enforce, as are the taxes on imports of coal,
natural gas, and petroleum derivates. More difficult assessment problems
arise with respect to imports of intermediate or final goods which have been
produced using fossil fuels. Unilateral carbon tax policies which do not
effectively tax such commodities could be unattractive both because they
create production inefficiencies, distorting production of these intermediate
goods away from domestic locations, and because the opportunities for offshore
production reduce the revenue potential of the tax.
Table 8 presents evidence directed at the potential importance of this
problem. The table synthesizes information from the 1985 input-output table
of the U.S. economy developed by the Office of Technology Assessment (1990).
The first column shows direct U.S. consumption of oil, coal, and natural
gas. 1 7 This is the total of fossil fuel use in either production or household
activities for the year in question. Column two shows energy imports. This
component of imported fossil fuel would be relatively easy to tax. The third
column shows the amount of fossil fuel embodied in non-fossil-fuel U.S.
imports. These estimates were made using the 1985 input output table, which
1 7The table shows refined petroleum only, since the input-output table
treats crude as an input to refined petroleum and the refined petroleum as the
input to all other activities.
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shows the total inputs of coal, oil, and natural gas to each of 85 categories
of goods. Combining these data with information on the value of imports in
each category, and assuming that the energy use coefficients for foreign
production are the same as those in the United States, yields estimates of the
amount of each fossil fuel which was used in producing imported goods.
Two conclusions emerge from this table. First, the embodied energy
imports are not trivial. The estimate in the third column equals approximate-
ly one eighth of total coal consumption, one tenth of natural gas use, and one
twentieth of refined petroleum use. Closer inspection of the goods which
account for embodied energy imports, however, shows that relatively few
imports -- steel, autos, and chemicals are the three most important -- account
for a very large share of the embodied fossil fuels. It would not seem
particularly difficult to levy import duties on these goods in proportion to
their estimated carbon emissions. 18
Taxing Emissions vs. Subsidizing Carbon Sequestering
The carbon tax raises the cost of adding carbon dioxide to the atmosphere.
It does not, however, provide similar incentives for all methods of altering
the global carbon balance. A notable omission is that a carbon tax does not
reward activities which remove carbon from the atmosphere; tree-planting is an
obvious example of such a carbon sequestering policy. Just as advocates of
tradable permits in more standard pollution contexts have long argued for
equating the marginal costs of each alternative method of changing the ambient
1 8This is the approach adopted under current U.S. law with the excise tax
on CFCs. The Treasury is empowered to estimate the CFC content of imported
goods, and, in cases where this estimate is impossible, can levy of tax of up
to five percent on imports. See Joint Committee on Taxation (1990).
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level of various pollutants, there is an argument for subsidizing projects
which reduce the level of global carbon.
A number of administrative issues make the implentation of carbon se-
questering subsidies difficult, however. The net private cost of some
sequestering activities, for example tree-planting, is small relative to the
potential public subsidy. If the subsidy assumes that trees live for many
years and draw CO2 from the atmosphere over their lifetime, tax cheats could
plant trees, collect their subsidy, destroy the trees, and collect another
subsidy. There are of course ways to minimize these problems: subsidies could
be tied to the land on which the trees are planted, limiting each property to
no more than one subsidy each fifteen or twenty years. Alternatively, the
subsidy could be provided incrementally in each'year the trees are alive.
A workable system of subsidies for carbon sequestering might be devised,
but it would require a higher degree of administrative organization than a
carbon tax. Rather than burdening a relatively simple carbon tax plan with
the complexities associated with policing carbon sequestering, policy in this
area might begin with a relatively small carbon tax and then address issues of
carobn sequestering at a later date.
Carbon Taxes vs. CFC Taxes
The carbon tax is not the only fiscal instrument which affects the
emission of greenhouse gases. A number of nations have already adopted limits
or taxes on CFC emissions; they are currently taxed in the United States
according to a sliding rate scale which is shown in Table 9. One policy
design issue which can readily be addressed involves setting appropriate
relative tax rates on CFCs and fossil fuels. This requires data the relative
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contribution of the various gases (per unit emitted) to greenhouse warming; in
turn, this requires information on the time profile of greenhouse effects for
the various gases, as well as the social time preference rate. Nordhaus
(1990a) explores the links between the relative greenhouse effects of dif-
ferent emissions, and finds that with a social discount rate of one percent
per year, one pound of CFC-11/12 has the same ultimate greenhouse effect as
1.184 tons of carbon emitted as CO2 (4.34 tons of CO2 ).1 9
If the only justification for taxing both carbon emissions and CFCs is to
avoid long-run global warming, then the tax rates on the two gases should be
set in proportion to their greenhouse effects. The second column of Table 9
shows the carbon taxes associated with current U.S. CFC tax levels. If a
carbon tax were adopted, some attempt to bring the rates of CFC and carbon
taxation into rough agreement would clearly be useful.
Other Issues
There are many questions concerning carbon tax design and implementation,
such as the phase-in rules which would be adopted, the treatment of exports
(can firms claim rebates for fossil fuels used in exported products?), and the
procedures for handling claims that some firms or households use fossil fuels
in ways which reduce CO2 emissions relative to standard estimates. These and
other issues would need to be addressed if a carbon tax were enacted.
Relative to many other fiscal instruments, however, the carbon tax seems
straightforward to specify and enforce.
1 91f the discount rate were zero, then one pound of CFC-11/12 is the
equivalent of .79 tons of carbon from C02; with a discount rate of four
percent per year, the equivalence factor is 1.42.
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6. Conclusions: General Principles to Guide Policy
This paper has analyzed a variety of issues associated with the design
and implementation of a carbon tax. Several findings emerge. First, if
implemented without any offsetting changes in transfer programs, the carbon
tax would be regressive. There are many ways to reduce this regressivity, for
example with offsetting changes in either the direct tax system or transfers.
Second, the efficiency costs of small carbon taxes, for example a tax of
$5/ton of carbon, are relatively small. For the United States, immediate
implementation of such a tax would impose annual efficiency costs of less than
$1 billion. Although some analyses have called for taxes at this level until
further information on global warming becomes available, other proposals
suggest far higher taxes. Stabilizing U.S. carbon dioxide emissions at their
1988 levels by the year 2000, for example, would require a carbon tax of close
to $100 per ton. This tax, which would more than triple the producer price of
coal and nearly double the producer prices of petroleum and natural gas, would
have much more significant efficiency effects. Implementing such a policy
might also affect the level of real output unless the monetary authority fully
compensated for the tax by raising the money supply. Third, a central issue
of carbon tax design is harmonization with other fiscal instruments designed
to reduce greenhouse warming. Ensuring comparability between taxes rates on
chlorofluorocarbons and fossil fuels is particularly important to avoid
unnecessary distortions in production and consumption decisions.
Although the paper concentrates on rather narrow issues involving carbon
taxes, several broader issues of policy design should also be recognized.
First, concerted international action in adopting carbon taxes would avoid
some of the administrative difficulties, and distortionary effects, of
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unilateral carbon tax adoption. If all nations participate in a carbon tax
treaty, the tax can be implemented by taxing all fossil fuel production at
mine-mouth or well-head. If a single country adopts the tax, however, it
becomes necessary to tax both imported fossil fuels as well as other products
which may embody fossil fuels. The multilateral approach, while solving this
problem, raises additional questions concerning compensation and the ap-
propriate distribution of revenues across nations.
Second, the current uncertainties regarding the future course of the
global environment suggest the need for policy flexibility. It is important
to avoid substantial efficiency costs or output losses today in pursuit of
uncertain future benefits.2 0 Because much new information is likely to
accumulate in the next decades both on the scientific basis of the greenhouse
effect and on the economic costs of countermeasures, current policy should
avoid irreversible decisions. Losses in real output from high current taxes
are irreversible. There is relatively little doubt that sharp increases in
energy prices from a carbon tax large enough to stabilize CO2 emissions near
current levels would have significant adverse effects on real GNP. A strong
case for the benefits of such a tax burden is therefore needed to outweigh
these costs.
Third, it is important to recognize that economic policy toward reducing
greenhouse emissions is part of a broader fabric of fiscal policy to encourage
economic growth, promote equitable distribution, and internalize external
effects. Some of these concerns operate directly with respect to the ap-
propriate levies on fossil fuels, and optimal tax rates on these fuels should
2 0This point has been made in many previous analyses of policy response
to global warming; examples are Lave (1988) and Nordhaus (1990b).
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not be determined solely by reference to carbon emission levels. The current
concern with greenhouse emissions may, however, provide a long-needed stimulus
for attempting to calibrate and implement these tax policies.
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Table 1: Regional and National Contributions to Greenhouse Warming
CO2 Emissions Methane CFC
Country Fossil Fuel Land Use Total Emissions Emissions Total
Europe .520 - .520 .085 .480 1.100
United States .530 .026 .533 .130 .350 1.013
USSR .450 --- .450 .060 .180 0.690
Brazil .023 .540 .563 .028 .016 0.607
China .260 --- .260 .090 .032 0.382
World 2.500 1.200 3.700 .800 1.400 5.900
24.2.
Note that
Source: World Resources Institute, World Resources: 1990-91, Table
Each entry reports CO2 equivalent emissions from different sources.
fossil fuel column includes CO2 emissions from cement production.
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Table 2: Carbon Taxes Rates ($US), Sweden and the Netherlands, 1990
Sweden Netherlands Finland
Gasoline
& Diesel Fuel
Coal
LPG
Natural Gas
Effective Date
$16.03/bbl.
97.69/ton
118.17/ton
2.63/103 cu.ft.
1/1991
$2.73/bbl.
1.49/ton
1.94/ton
0.029/103 cu.ft.
2/1990
$11.51/bbl.
3.89/ton
.08/103 cu.ft.
1/1990
Notes: Calculations for Sweden assume an exchange rate of 5.75 SEK/dollar,
while those for the Netherlands assume 1.75 guilders/dollar.
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Table 3: Proposed CO2 Stablization and Reduction Taxes, United States
Coal Oil Natural Gas
Unit of Measure Ton
Tons of Carbon/
Unit of Fuel .605
Carbon Emissions/
Billion BTUs .025
Average Mine-Mouth
or Wellhead Price, 1989 $23.02
CO2 Stabilization Tax ($100/ton):
Absolute Tax 60.50
Percentage of Price 263%
Slower CO2 Growth Tax ($5/ton):
Absolute Tax 3.17
Percentage of Price 13%
Barrel
.130
.020
$17.70
12.99
73%
0.65
4%
103 cu.ft.
.016
.015
$1.78
1.63
92%
0.08
5%
Notes: Data for row three are drawn from Manne and Richels (1989), for row
four from the Department of Energy, Annual Energy Outlook 1990, and for rows
two and five from the Congressional Budget Office (1990). Rows six and seven
are based on author's calculations.
Table 4: Fossil Fuel Consumption and Revenues from $100/Ton Carbon Tax
Fossil Fuel Consumption Carbon Tax Revenues
Coal Petroleum Natural Gas Level Percent
Country (M tons) (M bbls) (B cu.ft.) ($88 B) of GNP
OECD Europe 609 4511 8812 $109.8 1.99%
France 32 656 1007 12.1 1.28
W. Germany 211 884 2075 27.7 2.30
Italy 25 660 1283 12.1 1.47
U.K. 124 613 1990 18.8 2.31
Canada (0 584 2353 15.1 3.12
United States 883 6308 17933 164.6 3.42
Japan 125 1727 1586 32.6 1.15
OECD Total 1776 13482 31332 333.7 2.40
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, International Energy Annual 1988.
--
Table 5: Distribution of Energy Expenditures, United States,
Expenditures as a Percentage of Income:
Income
Decile Natural Gas Fuel Oil Gasoline Electricity
1 (Lowest) 4.6 2.0 14.7 12.6
2 3.9 0.6 6.1 6.3
3 3.1 0.6 6.7 5.2
4 2.7 0.6 6.3 4.6
5 2.1 0.5 5.6 4.0
6 1.5 0.5 5.2 3.1
7 1.3 0.4 4.5 2.8
8 1.0 0.3 4.2 2.4
9 0.9 0.3 3.8 2.1
10 0.7 0.1 2.5 1.6
Expenditures as a Percentage of Total Outlays:
Expenditure
Decile Natural Gas Fuel Oil Gasoline Electricity
1 (Lowest) 2.4 0.4 5.2 4.8
2 2.8 0.3 4.1 4.5
3 2.3 0.5 5.6 4.3
4 2.3 0.5 5.3 3.8
5 2.1 0.4 5.5 3.6
6 1.7 0.4 5.8 3.5
7 1.6 0.4 5.6 3.6
8 1.3 0.4 5.6 3.1
9 1.2 0.4 5.2 2.9
10 1.1 0.2 4.2 2.7
Source: Author's tabulations based on 1985-6 Consumer Expenditure Survey.
1986
Table 6: Distributional Incidence of $100/Ton Carbon Tax, United States, 1986
Distribution Across Income Classes
Income Decile Total Burden % of Income
1 (Lowest) $451.9 10.1%
2 374.6 5.0
3 484.6 4.6
4 521.0 4.1
5 563.7 3.6
6 608.6 3.0
7 689.6 2.7
8 762.6 2.3
9 875.3 2.1
10 889.7 1.5
Distribution Across Total Expenditure Classes
Expenditure Decile Total Burden % of Outlays
1 (Lowest) $252.5 3.7%
2 349.8 3.7
3 465.6 3.8
4 527.5 3.7
5 588.6 3.4
6 681.3 3.4
7 772.3 3.2
8 804.2 2.8
9 944.2 2.7
10 871.4 2.3
Source: Author's tabulations based on 1985-6 Consumer Expenditure Survey.
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Table 7: Production & Consumption Distortions for Carbon Taxes, United States
Coal Oil Natural Gas
Domestic Use ($1989B) 20 304 33
Demand Elasticities
Coal -0.56 0.22 0.16
Oil 0.10 -0.70 0.10
Natural Gas 0.12 0.13 -0.52
Slower CO2 Growth Tax ($5/ton):
Percentage of Price 13% 4% 5%
Deadweight Loss ($1989B) 0.09 0.17 0.02
Source: Row one is drawn from Table 4, row two from the Annual Energy Outlook:
1990, row two-four from Anderson, Hoffman, and Rusin(1990), and rows five and
six are the author's calculations.
Table 8: Fossil Fuel Embodied in U.S. Imports, 1985
Direct U.S. Energy Energy Embodied
Consumption Imports in Non-Energy Imports
Coal 773.6 2.9 106.3
(M tons)
Refined Petro- 5632.2 689.2 340.8
leum (M bbls)
Natural Gas 16372.3 920.9 1910.9
(B cu ft)
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Author's calculations based on the Office of Technology Assessment
(1990). The entries in row two refer to refined petroleum. If the calcula-
tions focused on crude oil instead, total U.S. consumption would be 4603,
imports 1189, and embodied imports 278.2.
Table 9: Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC-11 & CFC-12) Tax Rates, United States
Year Tax Rate (Dollars/Pound) Implied Carbon Tax (Dollars/Ton)
1990 $1.37 $1.16
1991 1.37 1.16
1992 1.67 1.41
1993 2.65 2.24
1994 2.65 2.24
1995 3.10 2.62
1996 3.55 3.00
2000 5.35 4.52
Source: Column 1: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation (1990). Column 2:
Author's estimate using Nordhaus' (1990b) calculations of the equivalent CO2
emissions per ton of CFC-l1/12 gas. I use the Nordhaus estimate of this ratio
assuming a discount rate of one percent per year.
